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BEYOND TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW TRIALS, 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS, AND OTHER 
TOOLS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY CAN AND 
SHOULD WORK TOGETHER 
Donald L. Hafner* 
Elizabeth B. L. King**
Abstract: Civil conºicts marked by human rights violations leave devas-
tated communities in their wake. The international community has an in-
terest in assuring that justice is done, an interest which the recent estab-
lishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) conªrms. The authors 
argue the ICC should be augmented by additional mechanisms to bear 
the burden of doing justice and reconstructing communities after such 
civil conºicts. This Article explores the potential tensions among such 
mechanisms, including national human rights trials, truth commissions, 
and community-based gacaca, and emphasizes the importance of consult-
ing victims in resolving these tensions. The authors conclude that the ICC 
should take the lead in coordinating the different mechanisms discussed 
in the Article as part of post-conºict reconstruction. 
Introduction 
 In the aftermath of civil conºict marked by widespread human 
rights violations, international criminal tribunals alone cannot bear 
the full burden of doing justice and stitching polities back together. 
They must be augmented by other mechanisms. Yet it is far from clear 
how to do this without each mechanism undercutting the effective-
ness of the others. 
 The last thirty years have witnessed a great proliferation of ap-
proaches to doing justice and restoring community after civil conºict. 
To the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the three international 
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tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone can be 
added roughly eleven national trials, thirty-one variations on ofªcial 
truth commissions, plus at least eight other panels of inquiry.1 The 
sheer variety reºects the application of cumulative experience, and yet 
as one observer has noted, “[n]o architect of these institutions has pro-
ceeded by deduction from general principles.”2 Even where they have 
drawn on prior experience, each of these mechanisms has been crafted 
by the ªne art of political compromise. Yet once in place, each variation 
has also attracted its partisans and critics, sparking sometimes construc-
tive, sometimes invidious, comparisons about which mechanism serves 
best. 
 Perhaps because the original ambitions for international tribunals 
were so expansive, both the record of tribunals and the initial aspira-
tions for them have become targets of disappointment and even cyni-
cism. This is unfortunate and requires a swift and thoughtful response, 
because we have no grounds for supposing that the need for interna-
tional vigor in protecting against human rights abuses has abated. 
Moreover, it would be lamentable if the inauguration of a permanent 
International Criminal Tribunal occurred simultaneously with the col-
lapse of conªdence in, and international support for, tribunals gener-
ally. Fortunately, even critics of tribunals generally share the same aspi-
rations as the advocates: 
Seeking justice through the institutions of the law is the best 
means of determining responsibility for acts of genocide, war 
crimes, and other politically motivated violations of human 
rights. Criminal prosecutions of crimes of this magnitude not 
only punish the individual who committed them, demonstrat-
ing that impunity does not exist, but also help to restore dig-
nity to their victims. They can provide a cathartic experience 
not only for individual victims, but also for society as a whole. 
By holding individuals responsible for their misdeeds, crimi-
                                                                                                                      
1 One source lists twenty-one truth commissions, four “historical truth commissions,” 
and four alternate forms of ofªcial or semi-ofªcial inquiry into the past. Priscilla B. 
Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions 305 
(2001). Since 2001, at least ten more truth commissions have been formed. The U.S. State 
Department’s Annual Human Rights reports list eleven countries where national prosecu-
tions for human rights abuses are on-going. See generally Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/. 
2 Henry J. Steiner, Symposium Comments, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
ASSESSMENT 8 (Henry J. Steiner ed., 1997). 
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nal trials may also deter the commission of abuses in the fu-
ture. Moreover, if conducted in strict accordance with legal 
due process, criminal prosecutions of war crimes can help to 
strengthen the rule of law and establish the truth about the 
past through accepted legal means.3
 These are all worthy aspirations, yet it is improbable that all can be 
achieved by any single way of doing justice. The criteria and pacing of 
meticulous criminal prosecutions will be very different from the social-
psychological requirements for community catharsis and restoration of 
individual dignity, or the scholarly requirements for an objective and 
thorough historical record. Among those who care about the success of 
criminal tribunals, there seems growing acknowledgement that tribu-
nals should be meshed with other mechanisms in order to serve all 
these aspirations—and wide agreement that this has not yet been 
achieved. The challenge here should not be underestimated. The aspi-
rations and claims made for both tribunals and other mechanisms ex-
tend across several disciplines, including law, politics, ethics, and social 
and individual psychology. For this reason, ªnding commonly intelligi-
ble language, common measures of effect, and common agreement on 
how to balance conºicting purposes against each other will not be easy. 
Nor should we expect a single moment of agreement and resolution; 
this will inevitably be a continuing conversation and debate. 
 This conversation must start with candor about the principal 
shortcoming of past and current international tribunals: the faint voice 
they grant to the actual communities torn by conºict.4 For a tribunal to 
                                                                                                                      
 
3 Timothy Phillips & Mary Albon, When Prosecution Is Not Possible: Alternative Means of 
Seeking Accountability for War Crimes, in War Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg 244, 244 
(Belinda Cooper ed., 1999); see Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: 
Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence 79, 88 (1998) (offering a summary 
of aspirations for truth commissions: “to overcome communal and ofªcial denial”; “to 
obtain the facts”; “to end and prevent violence”; “to forge the basis for a domestic democ-
ratic order”; “to support the legitimacy and stability of the new regime”; “to promote rec-
onciliation”; “to promote psychological healing”; “to restore dignity to victims”; “to punish, 
exclude, shame, and diminish offenders”; “to express and seek to achieve the aspiration 
that ‘never again’”; “to build an international order to try to prevent . . . aggression, tor-
ture, and atrocities”; “to accomplish each of these goals in ways that are compatible with 
the other goals”); see also id. at 79 (describing Bryan Hehir’s observations on the function 
of truth commissions); Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience, 2 J. Int’l Crim. 
Just. 427, 428 (2004). 
4 Neither tribunals nor truth and reconciliation committees (TRCs) have been espe-
cially effective in engaging local communities. See Hugh van der Merwe, National and Com-
munity Reconciliation: Competing Agendas in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice After Civil Conºict 85, 
102–04 (Nigel Biggar ed., 2001). Neither have they served well in providing psychological 
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serve a community scorched by atrocity, that community and its victims 
must be consulted on any plans for societal reconstruction and must be 
heard in meaningful ways. The importance of asking victims cannot be 
stressed enough. This consultation has been the great strength of al-
ternatives to tribunals that have emerged in the past thirty years; if a 
tribunal is to be for the victims, it also needs, at least in part, to be by 
them. There has been some imaginative tinkering with tribunals in this 
direction. For a while, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) used Rule 61 of its Rules of Procedures and 
Evidence in a manner akin to a truth commission.5 In Rwanda, a com-
munity-based system of adjudication analogous to traditional gacaca has 
been appended to national tribunals to speed up the resolution of local 
disputes and foster community re-integration. The ICC has established 
a Victims and Witnesses Unit to provide “protective measures and secu-
rity arrangements, counseling and other appropriate assistance for wit-
nesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are at risk 
on account of testimony given by such witnesses.”6 Yet there are limits 
to what mere tinkering can accomplish; tinkering concedes the short-
comings without fully meeting them. As one critic notes, “[t]he tribu-
nals cannot be ‘ªxed’ to address what is missing; instead, additional 
avenues must be found.”7 What is needed is a comprehensive set of 
mechanisms, operating in complementary ways with tribunals. 
 Two points must be made at the outset. First, those who care about 
the success of tribunals cannot simply protest that some tasks, such as 
                                                                                                                      
support for victims and survivors. See Debra Kaminer et al., The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa: Relation to Psychiatric Status and Forgiveness Among Survivors of 
Human Rights Abuses, 178 Brit. J. Psychiatry 373, 373–76 (2001). They have not, in our 
judgment, been shaped by any well-established theory of, or experience with, what has 
been termed “political healing.” 
5 See Yael Tamir, Symposium Comments, in Truth Commissions, supra note 2, at 35; 
see also Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugosla-
via: An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Diplomacy 100 (2004). Kerr notes that Richard 
Goldstone’s successor as prosecutor, Louise Arbour, abandoned this practice. 
6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 43(6), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Victims and Witnesses Unit helps witnesses 
obtain medical and psychological care, and its staff includes persons with expertise in 
trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda has a comparable unit to provide psychological care for victims/ 
witnesses and to accompany witnesses when they testify before the court, ensuring that 
they are mentally as well as physically supported throughout the experience. The reach of 
these units, of course, extends only to the few who appear as witnesses. See Statute of In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 21, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter 
ICTR Statute]. 
7 Julie Mertus, Only a War Crimes Tribunal, in War Crimes, supra note 3, at 242. 
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individual or political “healing,” are not judicial responsibilities appro-
priate for a judicial institution. It would be cruel to suppose that com-
munities devastated by civil conºict will always be able to handle the 
non-judicial tasks all on their own, and naïve to suppose that the inter-
national community will spontaneously step in to take up the burden. If 
these are important tasks in doing justice, then a proper international 
tribunal system should include multi-layered mechanisms able to 
achieve them. Second, the mechanisms for these tasks cannot simply be 
appended to tribunals in a thoughtless or casual fashion. There are 
fundamental tensions in missions and methods between tribunals and 
these other mechanisms that must be addressed. Unless they are inte-
grated and coordinated in a careful way, each will wander off in re-
sponse to its own organizational imperatives and enthusiasms. In the 
confusion and conºicts that result, tribunals will lose the cooperation 
and respect of states and publics that are vital to their success. 
 Consider, for instance, potential conºicts that arise from the com-
plementary roles of international tribunals on the one hand, and na-
tional human rights trials, truth and reconciliation commissions 
(TRCs), and community-based gacaca systems on the other.8 We take 
each of these cases in turn. 
I. International Tribunals and National Human Rights Trials 
 The value of having international tribunals work in coordination 
with national human rights trials is that both the national and the in-
ternational communities can have a role in determining accountability 
and restoring the state. When a country has the capacity, national trials 
have several advantages over international trials in adjudicating human 
rights cases. International criminal tribunals are limited by their man-
date and generally only have jurisdiction over the gravest crimes.9 As 
                                                                                                                      
8 We use the labels TRCs and gacaca in a generic sense here, not as speciªc references 
to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission or the Rwanda gacaca system. 
South Africa’s version of a truth and reconciliation commission is perhaps the best known, 
but it was not the ªrst to use this label. Rwanda has adopted the traditional term gacaca for 
its community-based courts, but their structure is not distinctively Rwandan and could be 
adapted to other settings. See Stef Vandeginste, Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity in the Context of Armed Conºict and Failed Political Transition, in Burying 
the Past, supra note 4, at 223–53. 
9 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 1-9, 
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 4–13; 
ICTR Statute, supra note 6, arts. 1–8; see also Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The 
International Criminal Court and National Prosecutions, A View from Haiti, 32 Colum. Hum. Rts. 
L. Rev. 201, 225 (2000). 
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such, they cannot try the vast number of cases left after the oppressors 
have been displaced from authority. National trials, however, are not so 
limited and can thus adjudicate many more cases.10 In situations where 
the number of cases is too numerous for any one court system, national 
and international tribunals can share the caseload to prevent undue 
delay. 
 Trials in the state where the atrocities occurred also help the 
state reestablish itself with its new and presumably more democratic 
government. Having the capacity to try perpetrators is evidence of a 
functioning judiciary and helps introduce the rule of law,11 and it may 
help prevent revenge killings.12 If the public views the trials as fair and 
just, the trials may also have the effect of increasing public conªdence 
in the new government.13 Thus, national trials have the potential to 
show the citizens of the state, as well as the international community, 
that the government is able to function and embodies a new distribu-
tion of political power. The empowering nature of national trials for 
victims can be signiªcant for political reconstruction: 
Victims of mass human rights violations are usually the least 
powerful in their own countries, and their countries are 
themselves often among the least powerful globally. Their vic-
timization is only part of a larger context of disempowerment. 
As a result, any remedy to the victim’s problems must, as 
much as possible, empower them by involving them in all as-
pects. . . . In many countries the formerly oppressed would be 
punishing their former oppressors for the ªrst time, through 
the medium of a justice system that was traditionally itself an 
instrument of oppression.14
National trials offer the new government, its citizenry, and the wider 
international community beneªts that international tribunals simply 
cannot, either because of their mandate or because of their location. 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Concannon, supra note 9, at 225. 
11 Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution 
and Truth Commissions, 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 81, 83 (1996). 
12 Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 7, 23 (2001) (explaining that “[t]he detention and trial of tens 
of thousands of génocidaires before Rwandese courts may be viewed as an alternative to 
mass expulsions or widespread extrajudicial executions and private revenge killings”); see 
Landsman, supra note 11, at 83–84. 
13 See Concannon, supra note 9, at 229. 
14 Id. at 228–29. 
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 National and international trials can and should complement each 
other. Indeed, the Rome Statute establishing the ICC anticipates that 
states will hold domestic trials concurrently with the ICC’s trials.15 Arti-
cle 17 of the Rome Statute provides for complementarity, meaning that 
the ICC gives primacy to the nation-state for adjudicating cases and that 
an international tribunal will only interfere where national courts are 
unwilling or unable to prosecute cases.16 This doctrine of complemen-
tarity recognizes the sovereignty of states and their desire to hold do-
mestic trials, but also provides for the possibility that some states may be 
“unwilling or unable” to do so and that in those instances the interna-
tional community has a legitimate interest in seeing justice done.17 
Complementarity serves the needs of the country rebuilding after 
atrocity by giving it the option to hold trials. It also serves the needs of 
the international community by allowing it to have a role in the adjudi-
cation of these heinous crimes. States and the ICC alike can even reap 
the beneªts of concurrent trials, as has happened in Rwanda: 
The initial distrust and tensions between the [International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)] and Rwanda have 
been replaced by increasing cooperation and understanding. 
The ICTR Ofªce of the Prosecutor has had greater contact 
with Rwandese magistrates in various communes and cooper-
ated in investigations. More and more Rwandese ofªcials— 
including lawyers from the court of appeals and the Supreme 
Court—have been attending ICTR proceedings in Arusha. 
The Rwandese government has appointed an ofªcial repre-
sentative to the ICTR to expedite the investigative access 
needed for effective prosecutions. Thus, the symbiosis be-
tween international and national trials has become increas-
ingly apparent.18
As long as the nation-state and the international community work to-
gether, it is possible to have concurrent trials that aid in the restora-
tion of the rule of law in a country reeling from mass violence.19
                                                                                                                      
 
15 See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17. 
16 See id. However, “[u]njustiªed delays in proceedings as well as proceedings which 
are merely intended to shield persons from criminal responsibility will not render a case 
inadmissible before the ICC.” ICC Criminal Court, Jurisdiction, http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
about/ataglance/jurisdiction.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006). 
17 See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17. 
18 Akhavan, supra note 12, at 26. 
19 It is worth noting that attorney Brian Concannon Jr., who has been working in Haiti 
for over ten years, proposes that the ICC employ attorneys and judges from countries who 
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 Despite their complementary potential, international tribunals 
and national trials can undermine each other, unless they act in coor-
dination. Even if it is a party to the Rome Statute, for instance, any 
government that wishes to impede the effectiveness of the ICC has 
ample latitude to do so within the treaty’s terms.20 However, the wor-
risome case is not where a government acts in bad faith with the de-
liberate intent of using national trials to thwart an international tri-
bunal, but where its own well-intentioned, but independent, action 
has the same effect. A state may make a political judgment that prose-
cutions for human rights abuses committed during a recently ended 
conºict might reignite the conºict or impede “national healing,” so it 
may grant wide amnesty to perpetrators.21 Such amnesties may not 
technically prevent an international tribunal from its own prosecu-
tions, yet they may shift political sentiment within the state in a way 
that makes witnesses less willing to cooperate and the government less 
willing to pursue or surrender defendants.22 A state may judge that it 
                                                                                                                      
 
are soon to be in need of the ICC’s assistance. His idea is that these attorneys and judges 
would then be able to go back to their countries and assist in national trials. See Concan-
non, supra note 9, at 230. 
20 Notwithstanding its general obligations to cooperate found in Part 9 of the Treaty, a 
State Party to the Rome Statute that wishes to forestall or entangle action by the ICC can 
do at least the following: seek a Security Council resolution that defers an investigation or 
prosecution (Article 16); pre-empt ICC action by undertaking an investigation or prosecu-
tion of its own (Article 17.1.a and Article 18.2); undertake an investigation of its own and 
reach a decision not to prosecute (Article 17.1.b); challenge the jurisdiction of the ICC or 
the admissibility of the speciªc case (Article 19.2.b and c); generally drag its feet with re-
spect to required cooperation under the Statute, e.g., in providing information about the 
status of its own investigation or prosecution (Article 18.5), in arresting and/or surrender-
ing persons sought by the ICC (Articles 19, 59, and 89), in aiding in the preservation and 
submission of evidence (Article 18.6 and Article 69.3), or in withholding information on 
grounds of national security concerns (Article 72). Rome Statute, supra note 6. 
21 See Minow, supra note 3, at 127: 
Leading participants in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion differ over the relationship between its work and prosecutions. Justice 
Minister Dullah Omar, who helped design the TRC, emphasizes that its work 
is not inconsistent with domestically conducted criminal prosecutions and in-
stead can build the factual bases for them. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who 
heads the commission, in contrast writes that “the purpose of ªnding out the 
truth is not in order for people to be prosecuted. It is so that we can use the 
truth as part of the process of healing our nation.” 
Id. But see Juan Méndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 Hum. Rts. Q. 255, 255–82 (1997) 
(presenting a spirited rebuttal of such views). 
22 The drafters of the Rome Statute were unable to reach consensus regarding the 
treatment of national amnesties, so the Statute lacks any speciªc reference to them. Of the 
treaty negotiations, Darryl Robinson says that: 
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must move swiftly with national trials to convict and exclude human 
rights abusers from political ofªce or authority and to consolidate a 
shift in political power.23 To achieve this objective, it may settle for 
lesser charges and more lenient sentences in order to clear cases as 
quickly as possible, with the paradoxical effect of tying its own hands 
politically when an international tribunal later seeks to press more 
serious charges. 
 The greatest potential for friction between international tribunals 
and national trials, however, may stem simply from the weakness of na-
tional judiciaries following civil conºict. In order for national trials to 
be effective, there must be a functioning and independent judiciary. 
Such independence is not always possible, especially in situations where 
the incoming government does not purge the former judiciary of un-
skilled, biased, or corrupt judges and lawyers.24 Where there has been 
                                                                                                                      
First of all, agreement would likely have been impossible, given the sharply 
clashing views on the matter. Second, even if there were agreement in princi-
ple, it would have been unwise to attempt to codify a comprehensive test to 
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable reconciliation measures 
and to lock such a test into the Statute. Thus, the drafters turned to the faith-
ful and familiar friend of diplomats, ambiguity, leaving a few small avenues 
open to the Court and allowing the Court to develop an appropriate ap-
proach when faced with concrete situations. 
Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 481, 483 (2003). 
23 Roland Paris argues that both national and international actors have an interest in 
resurrecting national court systems promptly after civil conºict, as a way of regulating who 
may compete for public ofªce: 
Although international peace-building agencies have assisted in the drafting 
and oversight of electoral laws in war-shattered states, they have generally 
been reluctant to become directly involved in regulating the activities of po-
litical parties. In only one mission—Bosnia—did international ofªcials pro-
hibit certain individuals from contesting public ofªce: namely, individuals in-
dicted for war crimes. . . . Holding elections soon after the termination of 
hostilities is still treated as a top priority that trumps virtually all others, in-
cluding the question of whether peace can survive the pressures of electoral 
mobilization, given the character of the political parties that are likely to con-
test the election. If local parties preach intolerance and hatred toward their 
rivals, or display little commitment to sustaining democracy once in power, 
there is little to be gained by proceeding with elections. Instead, peace-
builders should use the period leading up to elections to promote modera-
tion within existing parties, to foster the growth of new democratic and mod-
erate parties, and if necessary, prevent the most intolerant individuals and 
parties from running for public ofªce. 
Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conºict 190 (2004). 
24 See Landsman, supra note 11, at 84–85. 
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wholesale regime change, the new government must have established 
laws to prosecute cases, which implies a functioning parliament. It also 
must have the necessary human resources: judges, prosecutors, police 
investigators, and defense counsel. Security concerns in a post-conºict 
state can also impede national trials. Unless judges, lawyers, and victims 
can be protected from retaliation, they are not likely to participate in 
trials where their former oppressors are the defendants, especially if the 
defendants still wield some power.25 Rwanda demonstrates both the 
challenges and the possibilities. Rwanda was party to the 1948 Geno-
cide Convention prior to 1994, but it had not incorporated the Con-
vention into domestic law and thus had no law against genocide. The 
ranks of attorneys were depleted by those who had been killed, had 
ºed, were implicated in the genocide, or had lost family and property 
and were unwilling to defend perpetrators.26 Despite these setbacks, 
Rwanda enacted laws covering the genocide, made imaginative use of 
national and international resources to form a cadre of attorneys, and 
now stands as an example of how concurrent national and interna-
tional trials can be conducted. 
 Nonetheless, there is substantial risk. If a government proceeds 
with trials even though the national court system is neither stable, in-
dependent, nor secure, the trials may end up backªring, undercutting 
the ability of the government to cooperate with subsequent interna-
tional tribunal prosecutions. Greater collaboration from the outset be-
tween international tribunals and national authorities would diminish 
these risks; widespread and continuing consultation with the popula-
tion will be indispensable in giving legitimacy to this collaboration.27
II. International Tribunals and Truth Commissions 
 The value of having international tribunals work in coordination 
with truth commissions lies in the latitude available to TRCs for sketch-
ing a larger picture of the extent of atrocity and responsibility than 
might be feasible with the more focused indictments and prosecutions 
of tribunals or national trials. This latitude in turn may help clarify the 
                                                                                                                      
25 In Rwanda, between 1994 and 1997, over three hundred survivors scheduled to tes-
tify as witnesses were murdered. Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Post-Conºict Tran-
sitions: A Social Scientist’s Perspective on the African Case, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 64, 67–8 (2001). 
26 See Vandeginste, supra note 8, at 23–34; see also Widner, supra note 25, at 65, 69. 
27 The Nuremberg prosecutions after WWII were not especially effective in earning le-
gitimacy from the German population, not even among those who felt betrayed by their own 
leaders, apparently because the Allies failed to grasp how the public perceived their efforts. 
See Jörg Friedrich, Nuremberg and the Germans, in War Crimes, supra note 3, at 87–106. 
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historical record, counteract communal and ofªcial denials, and per-
haps grant to victims the dignity of formal acknowledgment of their 
suffering, even if they personally do not appear as witnesses.28 More-
over, precisely because TRCs are not judicial bodies with complex rules 
of procedure and evidence, they may be able to set about their work 
more swiftly than tribunals, with greater participation of the commu-
nity in setting the focus of inquiry, and with fewer resources. This may 
be true even where TRCs are given a quasi-judicial power to grant am-
nesty in exchange for testimony. TRCs may also aid political reconstruc-
tion by signaling and adding momentum to a shift in political power 
away from perpetrators and toward victims and human rights defend-
ers.29 To the extent that TRCs are seen by the community as connected 
to tribunals, they can lend legitimacy to, and encourage cooperation 
with, the tribunals’ actions. 
 On the other hand, in the absence of coordination, the fact that 
TRCs can move more swiftly can complicate or undermine the effec-
tiveness of international tribunals. Whether responding to a legislative 
mandate, community expectations, or its own organizational dynamic 
in shaping its inquiries, a TRC will generate a version of “truth” and of 
appropriate “justice” to which any subsequent tribunal will be com-
pelled to respond if it values its own legitimacy, even though the TRC 
may have radically departed from judicial rules and procedures that a 
tribunal must follow. Victims who pour out their souls before a TRC 
have expectations that punishments will follow and therefore will ex-
                                                                                                                      
28 We are skeptical that TRCs in fact do much, in themselves, to bring about commu-
nal reconciliation, and even more skeptical that they promote psychological healing for 
individuals or communities. As Hayner notes, “The Trauma Centre for Victims of Violence 
and Torture in Cape Town has estimated, judging from the hundreds of victims they’ve 
worked with, that 50 to 60 percent of those who gave testimony to the commission suffered 
difªculties after testifying, or expressed regret for having taken part . . . .” Hayner, supra 
note 1, at 144. Nonetheless, properly employed, TRCs can be a valuable tool in the transi-
tional justice process. 
29 Elizabeth Kiss commented on the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Rec-
onciliation: 
I also want to address the question of how political the process of truth-telling 
really is. . . . The ªrst level involves the commission’s ofªcial imprimatur. It is 
not just that someone is interested in listening to the experience, but that the 
listener has ofªcial status. Chileans who came to tell their story to the truth 
commission were moved by the Chilean ºag that was prominently displayed 
on the table. 
Elizabeth Kiss, Symposium Comments, in Truth Commissions, supra note 2, at 25. 
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pect a tribunal to take note of their agonies.30 If a TRC offers amnesty 
to perpetrators in exchange for testimony, or alerts perpetrators to 
their vulnerability and sends them into hiding, it can impede the tribu-
nal’s subsequent ability to gain their custody as defendants or their co-
operation as material witnesses.31 If the TRC performs its tasks badly— 
due to political constraints, insufªcient resources, or errors in judg-
ment—it can generate disillusionment among victims and survivors 
and increase their sense of vulnerability, undercutting the tribunal’s 
ability to gain their cooperation as well.32
 Unless closely coordinated with other institutions, TRCs may be 
subject to their own organizational dynamics in ways that send them off 
on unanticipated paths. The South African TRC, for instance, was con-
ceived by some as a complement to national and international prosecu-
tions for deeds committed (on either side) during the apartheid era. 
Indeed, if there had been no possibility of such prosecutions, then the 
TRC’s offer of amnesty in exchange for testimony might not have had 
much appeal to perpetrators. Along the way, however: 
The commission’s objectives shifted as different actors and 
constituencies became involved in the process. Although am-
nesty to the perpetrators was initially the central objective, at 
later stages, the victims became the focal point. As religious 
leaders and churches became increasingly involved in the 
commission’s work, the inºuence of religious style and sym-
bolism supplanted political and human rights concerns.33
                                                                                                                      
 
30 See Rachel Sieder, War, Peace, and the Politics of Memory in Guatemala, in Burying the 
Past, supra note 4, at 191–93. 
31 When Louise Arbour replaced Richard Goldstone as Chief Prosecutor with the 
ICTY, she dropped Goldstone’s use of public hearings under Rule 61 in a fashion analo-
gous to TRCs and shifted to secret indictments instead, on the reasoning that open hear-
ings complicated the task of arresting suspects. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 100, 159, 183. 
32 See van der Merwe, supra note 4, at 86. 
33 Andre du Toit, Symposium Comments, in Truth Commissions, supra note 2, at 20. 
du Toit also notes: 
Archbishop Tutu, as well as many other commission members, interprets the 
truth commission’s role in terms of justice, truth, and reconciliation. When I 
participated in the earlier preparations for the commission, we discussed rec-
onciliation in a more political sense. A religious terminology has become 
more prevalent. Reconciliation now means something akin to forgiveness. 
While criminal prosecution is clearly an alternative to political reconciliation, 
it is not so clearly related to spiritual forgiveness. The religious framework has 
resulted in a shifting of the alternatives. Some observers have commented 
that this new framework is useful. People must be able to open their wounds, 
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In turn, as the TRC redeªned its objectives, it moved increasingly away 
from judicial methods: 
Criminal prosecutions involve an adversarial system. Consider, 
for example, whether cross-examination of witnesses, includ-
ing victims, is appropriate in the context of a truth commis-
sion. Trials focus on the perpetrators, whereas truth commis-
sions may choose to focus on victims. Perhaps we assume in 
trials that the focus on the perpetrator is compatible with the 
victim’s interests. We assume, then, that the victim desires 
punishment of the perpetrator. If that means the victim must 
be cross-examined, he is willing to accept it. I do not believe 
all victims think this way. Many are more interested in the res-
toration of their human and civic dignity. This may be difªcult 
to attain in the adversarial context of trials.34
Such changes in motive and method may serve worthy purposes, yet 
they clearly put TRCs in tension with the judicial and adversarial 
method of establishing truth and dispensing justice. 
III. International Tribunals and Community-Based Gacaca 
 The value of having international tribunals work in coordination 
with community-based adjudication systems lies in the direct contact 
that gacaca can establish with the local communities that must ulti-
mately grant legitimacy and stability to national and international tri-
bunals—an intimacy of contact that even truth commissions cannot 
provide.35 Trials are an important tool in doing justice and restoring 
                                                                                                                      
 
yet accept the fact that this will not result in punishment of the perpetrators. 
The religious theme of forgiveness helps people make sense of this situation. 
See id. at 53. 
34 du Toit, supra note 33, at 36. 
35 van der Merwe notes: 
The [South African Truth and Reconciliation] Commission’s consultations 
with local communities in preparation for the hearing were usually very lim-
ited. It often only consulted signiªcantly with the local town council, who in 
turn were expected to communicate with other parties. Stakeholders not rep-
resented in this formal structure often felt left out. This was particularly the 
case with groups explicitly representing victims’ concerns. . . . In many com-
munities, the hearings were often only one day in length, covering only ten or 
eleven cases of victimization. Less than ten percent of the victims who made 
statements [to the TRC staff] had the opportunity to testify in public. Many 
more victims wanted the opportunity to tell their stories, and felt angered 
that the TRC seemingly did not see their experiences as sufªciently sig-
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political community, yet the “assumption that holding individuals ac-
countable for atrocities alleviates despair, provides closure, assists in 
creating and strengthening democratic institutions, and promotes 
community rebuilding overstates the results that trials can achieve.”36 
Tribunals are too remote from the people to accomplish all that has 
been expected of them. 
 At the most basic level, international tribunals are geographically 
remote. The ICC and the ICTY sit in The Hague. The seat of the ICTR 
is in Arusha, Tanzania, and even television broadcasts of the trials in 
Rwanda cannot bring them close to the vast majority of Rwandans who 
lack access to televisions.37 Tribunals are also procedurally remote from 
all but the smallest fraction of victims and survivors. In a trial system, 
the focus is on the offenders—determining their guilt or innocence— 
while the victims are essentially treated as tools in the prosecutors’ case, 
conªned in their testimony to only those fragments of their experience 
that meet the legal standard of relevant evidence. Tribunals may also be 
culturally remote, designed and conducted in the main from a Euro-
pean perspective. As one critic notes: 
[W]e occasionally come dangerously close to determining 
from a long distance what societies torn by violence actually 
require, and we do not stop to consider the views of the peo-
ple who have to live with the legacy of the abuse and also with 
the consequences of a policy to deal with that legacy.38
Finally, tribunals are remote from the daily life of communities where 
victims and perpetrators confront each other. Where the violence of 
civil conºict was widespread, eventually partisans from both sides are 
going to return to communities and often will have to live alongside the 
                                                                                                                      
niªcant. . . . The selection of cases to be heard at the hearings was done by 
the TRC independently of community input. . . . Community members were 
also suspicious about the selection of cases. They wondered why certain cases 
that they saw as particularly signiªcant were left out. There was even specula-
tion among some communities that this was due to secret deals between local 
political leaders and TRC ofªcials, aimed at covering up the involvement of 
party ofªcials. 
van der Merwe, supra note 4, at 93–94. 
36 Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 Hum. Rts. Q. 573, 601 (2002). 
37 Neil J. Kritz, War Crimes Trials: Who Should Conduct Them—and How, in War Crimes, 
supra note 3, at 168, 171. 
38 Juan E. Méndez, National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the International 
Criminal Court, 15 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 25, 44 (2001). 
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people they once considered enemies. Even where a human rights 
abuser has been punished by the court, this does not assure that in the 
eyes of the community, justice has been done and all debts paid.39 
Other mechanisms for accountability at the community level must sup-
plement trials. 
 Gacaca, the community adjudication system in Rwanda, is part 
court, part truth commission, and part community council. The hope 
was that gacaca would help resolve the massive number of grievances 
of neighbor against neighbor, restore communities, reintegrate per-
petrators who had served their time back into their villages, and pro-
vide victims with a sense of justice.40 In the process, they can also sig-
nal at the community level that a shift in political power has put an 
end to the rule of human-rights abusers. 
 Gacaca is a local tradition in Rwanda that has historically been used 
to resolve local community conºicts.41 In the typical gacaca setting, 
members of the community come together and resolve conºicts in a 
participatory way: “members of local communities settle interpersonal 
differences through the election of sages and leaders who endeavor to 
                                                                                                                      
39 It is important to note that re-integration does not necessarily mean forgiveness. Of-
ten, the most one can hope for is that those on opposites cease to hate one another. BBC 
journalist Robert Walker observed this in a Rwandan gacaca session: 
Mr. Gasana lost everyone in the genocide—his mother and father, wife and 
children, brothers and sisters. Now some of those involved in the killings have 
come back to the village. Mr. Gasana and his neighbours, sitting in a gacaca—a 
village-based court—must decide who was responsible. Who killed, raped or 
looted during the three months of genocide when about 800,000 people, 
mainly Tutsis, were slaughtered across Rwanda. Nearby, I meet Jean de Dieu Cy-
iza. He is one of those who has confessed to participating in the genocide. Mr. 
Cyiza tells me he killed ªve Tutsi children. “The government soldiers told me to 
kill them. To save myself I decided to do it. I killed them with a machete,” he 
says. Gasana listens to the conversation. Mr. Cyiza killed his brother’s children. 
Mr. Gasana’s face betrays him a little, he nods at certain points, as if to conªrm 
what Mr. Cyiza is saying. “Cyiza did very wrong things,” Mr. Gasana says after-
wards. But today, since Mr. Cyiza’s release from prison, the two men live as 
neighbours once again. 
Robert Walker, Rwanda Still Searching for Justice, BBC News, Mar. 30, 2004, http://newsvote. 
bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3557753.stm. 
40 One estimate is that at the end of the genocide, over 130,000 people were in prison 
for allegedly committing acts of genocide. See Alana Erin Tiemessen, After Arusha: Gacaca 
Justice in Post-Conºict Rwanda, 8 Afr. Stud. Q. 57, 57 (2004). Another estimate puts the 
number at around 122,000. See Vandeginste, supra note 8, at 234. By either count, at the 
rate the national courts were resolving cases, it would have taken over two hundred years 
to try all those being held. See id. 
41 Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 
41, 55 (2005) [hereinafter Drumbl, Law and Atrocity]. 
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bring the disputants together in the pursuit of communal justice.”42 In 
these public hearings, wrongdoers may receive sentences other than jail 
time: community service, public shaming, obligations to make repara-
tions or apologies, or other alternative forms of punishment.43
 The gacaca system fashioned by the Rwandan government in Oc-
tober 2000 is a mutated version of the traditional gacaca, and as such, it 
could be broadly adopted elsewhere. Crimes connected with the geno-
cide were divided into categories of severity.44 Several levels of gacaca 
courts were established, and each successive level handles crimes of 
higher severity as well as hearing appeals from the judgments of lower 
gacaca.45 The gacaca were given jurisdiction over crimes committed be-
tween October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994,46 and only over inten-
tional and unintentional homicides, property crimes, and assaults.47 
They do not, however, have jurisdiction over crimes relating to inciting 
or organizing the genocide, nor do they have jurisdiction over crimes 
of sexual violence.48 Gacaca judges apply the same law as the national 
                                                                                                                      
42 Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1221, 1264 (2000) [hereinafter Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide]. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. at 1264–65. 
45 See Vandeginste, supra note 8, at 234; see also Drumbl, Law and Atrocity, supra note 41, 
at 58–59 (discussing how gacaca now also have such powers as the ability to summon wit-
nesses and issue search warrants). 
46 See Tiemessen, supra note 40, at 61. This jurisdiction period is, however, longer than 
that of the ICTR, which is January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1994. See ICTR Statute, 
supra note 6, art. 7. The temporal jurisdiction of the gacaca has been criticized for having 
the effect of focusing on the crimes of the Hutu and ignoring the long prior history of 
human rights abuses by the Tutsi as well. See Sarah L. Wells, Gender, Sexual Violence and Pros-
pects for Justice at the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 14 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 167, 179 
(2004). 
47 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the national courts deal with 
the most serious crimes, with the ICTR having primacy. Although the maximum penalty at 
the ICTR is life in prison, the national courts can impose the death penalty. This differ-
ence resulted in the leaders of the genocide tried at the ICTR being able to escape the 
death penalty, while lower-level offenders tried in Rwandan courts were sentenced to 
death. See Madeline Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide: Rwanda, in War Crimes, supra 
note 3, at 213–14. A survey done in 1996, before the gacaca system was established, found 
that Rwandans wanted the state and not the gacaca to deal with the genocide. Respondents 
also stated that when perpetrators were found guilty, they (or a member of their family) 
should be killed, thus “enable[ing] forgetting and forgiveness and lead[ing] to a recon-
ciliation of the families involved.” Vandeginste, supra note 8, at 239. 
48 Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 355, 371 (2002); see also Drumbl, Law and Atrocity, supra note 41, 
at 55–56. 
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courts, but they can hand down remedies aimed at restoring commu-
nity, such as reparations or community service.49
 The gacaca system does have shortcomings. Reliance on commu-
nity courts can be problematic if the sense of “community” has been 
destroyed by civil conºict.50 In Rwanda, for instance, post-genocide 
reconstruction has involved setting up new villages, often peopled by 
some of the 3.2 million refugees who returned to Rwanda between 
1993 and 2002.51 Some of these refugees had been living outside 
Rwanda for ªfty years or more and had doubtful ties to the country, 
let alone to a community.52 Rwanda also demonstrates that the col-
lapse of civil order and effective police forces may make it difªcult to 
protect gacaca participants from intimidation.53 The fact that the vast 
majority of gacaca have yet to initiate proceedings raises questions 
about whether this extension of the state court system down to the 
local level has been accepted as legitimate by communities.54 Finally, 
the use of these informal courts brings up issues of fairness and due 
process. Defendants at gacaca are not represented by legal counsel,55 
and they have limited rights to appeal.56 Gacaca judges receive little 
training, which has given rise to challenges of bias.57 Furthermore, 
the judges’ ability to reduce sentences in favor of community service 
may have the effect of encouraging false confessions, especially for 
                                                                                                                      
49 The community service might include building schools, roads, and community 
buildings, ªrst aid or educational initiatives, or cultivating crops. See Maya Goldstein-
Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J. Disp. Resol. 355, 
394–95; see also Drumbl, Law and Atrocity, supra note 41, at 56; Drumbl, Punishment, Post-
genocide, supra note 42, at 1265. 
50 See Wells, supra note 46, at 177–78. 
51 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Voluntary Repatria-
tion in Africa: Levels and Trends 1993–2002, at 4 (2004), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/events/opendoc.pdf?tbl=EVENTS&id=404886df4. 
52 See Daly, supra note 48, at 380. 
53 In March 2004, for example, fourteen people were sentenced to death for killing 
survivors of the genocide who were expected to testify in the gacaca. See Goldstein-Bolocan, 
supra note 49, at 392. 
54 As of December 2004, only 750 of over 10,000 gacaca were actively involved in trials. 
See Wells, supra note 46, at 174. Nonetheless, by the end of 2005, 1,521 trials had been 
completed by gacaca. Fawzia Sheikh, Trial and Error: Community Courts, New Internation-
alist, Dec. 2005, No. 385, at 17. 
55 See Daly, supra note 48, at 382. 
56 See Drumbl, Law and Atrocity, supra note 41, at 58. 
57 See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 49, at 386. 
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those alleged perpetrators who have already been in prison for 
years.58
 Although the gacaca courts have met with mixed success, they can 
provide a useful complement to national or international courts, truth 
commissions, and other mechanisms of justice. Moreover, at least in the 
conªguration adopted in Rwanda, the gacaca system poses rather minor 
complications for the operation of international tribunals. In principle, 
gacaca might complicate the work of tribunals in the same ways that na-
tional trials and TRCs can—by shaping public perceptions of truth, 
making witnesses or defendants less willing to cooperate, etc. In prac-
tice, gacaca handle low-level crimes and disputes that may be vital to 
political reconstruction at the community level and yet are of little 
bearing on tribunal prosecutions. The greater risk is that a poorly-
managed and poorly-staffed gacaca system will erode community 
conªdence in judicial action generally—whether national or interna-
tional—as the proper way to do justice after civil conºict. For this rea-
son, international tribunals have an interest in seeing that gacaca 
mechanisms are wisely constructed and adequately supported. 
Conclusion 
 Civil conºicts marked by mass human rights violations leave devas-
tated societies in their wake. Increasingly these conºicts involve geno-
cide, mutilation, rape, abduction and coerced conscription of children, 
destruction of villages, forced migration, and other horrors. The inter-
national community has an interest and a stake in assuring that justice 
is done, in the broadest sense, in the resolution of these conºicts. The 
recent establishment of the ICC afªrms this, and arguably, the ICC now 
stands at the pinnacle of international obligations to see that justice is 
served. It is therefore reasonable that the ICC should take the lead in 
coordinating the array of mechanisms needed in any post-conºict re-
construction. Such coordination would yield greater effect than if each 
entity just fumbles along on its own. Coordination certainly would help 
the ICC mitigate the clashes of method and purpose that have been 
discussed in this paper. 
 We can anticipate an objection that if the ICC (or any other inter-
national tribunal) were to take on this coordinating task, it may mean 
delaying its own proceedings while it gets all the other mechanisms ar-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Daly, supra note 48, at 382. Some 30,000 prisoners in Rwanda “have confessed to 
participating in the genocide with a view to facing gacaca proceedings instead of the na-
tional court system.” Drumbl, Law and Atrocity, supra note 41, at 54. 
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rayed in proper sequence. On this point, we are persuaded by the ar-
gument of Louise Arbour, former Chief Prosecutor with the ICTY: 
Human rights trials are an important contribution to peace and recon-
ciliation. 
[T]hey should be conducted solemnly and with gravitas. 
There is an international interest, as well as the interest of the 
victims, which should be set above the rights of accused to a 
speedy trial . . . in assessing where the correct balance lies be-
tween the rights of the accused and the international interest, 
the Tribunal should err on the side of the international inter-
est, which is concomitant with the interest of the victims . . . .59
Justice demands no less. 
                                                                                                                      
59 Kerr, supra note 5, at 98 (quoting from an interview with Arbour). 
